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FACULTY UNIONISM AND COLLEGIAL DECISION-
MAKING 
COMPATIBLE OR CONTRADICTORY? 
ROY J. ADAMS 
In a récent essay H. D. Woods argued that the adoption of collec-
tive bargaining by Canadian university faculty members posed a serious 
threat to collégial decision-making on campus.l Woods dénotes Ave 
areas of decision-making which « taken together indicate the sine qua 
non of académie freedom.» Thèse are: 
Freedom to sélect teachers ; 
Freedom to détermine curriculum ; 
Freedom to décide on teaching method ; 
Freedom to sélect and promote students ; 
Independent sélection of research projects and the pursuit of 
knowledge. 
It is suggested that thèse freedoms will be eroded by the achieve-
ment of « genuine unionism » which will « convert the university into an 
authoritarian managerial hierarchy on the one hand, and a managed 
employée group of académie staff on the other». This is so, according 
to Woods, because collective bargaining is adversarial in nature and 
thus will resuit in «splitting the universities horizontally». 
We suggest that Woods' thesis is incorrect in several respects. 
Rather than being contradictory, collective bargaining and collégial 
decision-making are complementary processes. Unionization is an 
instrument which may be effectively used to support, rather than under-
mine, académie freedom. Moreover, by unionizing, faculties increase 
rather than decrease their influence over university affairs. 
To begin with, the freedoms noted by Professor Woods exist in 
most universities at the discrétion of the administration.2 Their tenuous 
nature is indicated by several récent incidents. At the University of 
Manitoba the président unilaterally decided to apply a quota on the 
number of professors who would be allowed to achieve tenure, thus 
severely restricting the «right» of the faculty to sélect permanent 
colleagues.3 At Notre Dame University in Nelson, B.C., the adminis-
tration attempted to unilaterally discontinue the tenure System which is 
the primary safeguard of académie freedom. The président of St. Tho-
* Adams, R.J., Assistant Professor of Industrial Relations, Faculty of Business, 
McMaster University, Hamilton, Ontario. 
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 H. D. WOODS, «Collective Bargaining and Académie Freedom: Are They 
Compatible?» Relations Industrielles, Vol. 30, No. 4, 1975. 
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 University Senate's do often hâve certain rights granted by law, however. 
3
 Thèse incidents hâve been reported in various issues of the CAUT Bulletin. 
See especially the articles by Donald C. SAVAGE, «Professional Societies and Trade 
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mas University challenged a pétition by the faculty to become a 
certified union by claiming that he had an absolute right to décide 
university policy, free from union interférence, under the University 
Act. His claim was not, however, upheld in the courts. At Simon 
Fraser University the administration temporarily suspended the arbi-
tration clause of the tenure agreement and fired several professors. 
The principal of Algoma University Collège in Ontario over-ruled a 
faculty recommendation that a sociology professor of Asian origin be 
given a regular appointment because the sociology department would 
then be entirely staffed by Indians. The principal instead forced the 
acceptance of a less well-qualified American. The Indian professor 
charged the university with discrimination and the principal's décision 
was overturned after a légal battle. 
This list of incidents of administrative usurption of presumed 
faculty «rights» is by no means exhaustive. Rather, in an era of financial 
uncertainty, the list has been growing rapidly. However, it must be 
admitted that the faculty prérogatives specified by Woods do exist (to 
some degree) in practice on most university campuses in Canada. In 
part, this is due to démocratie traditions and the high value placed on 
free inquiry by the university community. It is also due, in part, to 
informai pressure exerted by faculty members for more influence on 
university governance during the past few décades. There are also very 
practical reasons for collégial decision-making. 
There is gênerai concensus among most professors and administra-
i s that teaching and research excellence is the overriding raison 
d'être for the existence of universities, and collégial decision-making 
is designed to achieve thèse goals. Teacher and student sélection and 
promotion, curriculum détermination, teaching methods, and research 
strategy are, expérience suggests, best decided by responsible experts; 
and it is the faculty, not the administration, who hâve the necessary 
expertise to make adéquate judgements. 
For thèse practical as well as political reasons university admin-
i s t r a i s hâve acquiesed to the exercise of collégial decision-making. 
Collective bargaining would not invalidate the value of collegiality. 
Rather, it provides the faculty with an instrument that is more power-
ful than any currently available for upholding collégial «rights». The 
early évidence indicates that many faculty members hâve turned to 
collective bargaining for precisely this reason. At some Canadian 
universities collégial structures hâve been created only subséquent to 
the establishment of collective bargaining.4 Moreover, contrary to 
Unions, the Canadian Expérience in Higher Education», March, 1973 and «Collective 
Bargaining: The State of the Nation», September, 1974. 
4
 «Faculty Organizing: Spécial Report», White-Collar Report, No. 989, March 
26, 1976 and Mark THOMPSON, «Collective Bargaining in Canadian Universities», 
IRRA Proceedings of Annual Meeting, Dallas, 1976. The St. Mary's agreement, for 
example, created faculty councils while the Carleton agreement created a représentative 
form of governance for librarians. 
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Professor Woods' hypothetical suppositions, évidence to date indicates 
that collective bargaining and collegiality may co-exist satisfactorily.5 
Another difficulty with Woods' thesis is the raising of the buga-
boo of adversarialism. What this term means precisely has never been 
clear to me. Those who use it usually fail to define it explicitly but it 
seems to include the following characteristics : 
a. deep distrust between employée organizations and management. 
b. the continuai use or threat of force. 
c. blind adhérence to the ideology of one side or the other. 
d. the absence of co-operative efforts to the advantage of the enter-
prise as a whole. 
Many observers of North American industrial relations, including 
Professor Woods, hold the view that collective bargaining and adver-
sarialism are necessary concomitants. I suggest that this proposition 
is not an adéquate représentation of expérience. The adversarial model 
does approximate conditions in many union-management situations in 
Canada; but it is neither so pervasive, nor so inévitable, as we are 
led to believe. There are, in fact, many union-management relation-
ships which are quite amicable. Although not the norm, there are 
large numbers of employers who openly admit that they could not do 
their job so well in the absence of a union. The Union-Management 
Services Branch of the Canada Department of Labour has continually 
worked to establish, often successfully, co-operative mechanisms in 
unionized companies. In wider perspective, the compatibility of co-
opération and negotiation is nowhere more clearly illustrated than in 
Germany where co-determination and collective bargaining hâve 
successfully co-existed for a quarter of a century. 
Adversarialism, where it exists in Canada, is, we suggest, primarily 
the resuit of management intransigence — the obstinate refusai to 
share power. Because of the historical record, adversarialism is now 
built into the psyché of many industrial unions who suspect ail manage-
ment motives. In the university no such tradition exists. Rather, the 
propensity of most faculty members is to be co-operative. Thus, uni-
versity administrators, when faced with the possibility of unionization, 
hâve the opportunity of developing a viable co-operative System. If 
they should adopt the stratégies of their industrial counterparts and 
5
 E. D. DURYEA and R. S. FISK and Associates, Faculty Unions and Collec-
tive Bargaining, San Francisco, Jossey-Bass, 1973; James P. BEGIN, «Faculty Gover-
nance and Collective Bargaining, An Early Appraisal», Journal of Higher Education, 
Vol. XIV, No. 8, November, 1974; Michael A. FALCONE, «Collective Bargaining: 
Its Effects on Campus Governance», Académie Collective Bargaining Information Ser-
vice, Spécial Report, No. 16, February, 1975; I. B. MCKENNA, CAUT Handbook on 
Collective Bargaining, CAUT, Ottawa, 1976. 
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'fight' unionization, hostile adversarialism will probably be the outcome. 
Unfortunately, this reaction seems to be the norm to date in Canada.6 
Missing from Professor Woods discussion was any considération 
of compensation and employment security. In gênerai, administrations 
hâve until now wielded unilatéral power concerning thèse issues. 
Despite many reports to the contrary, faculty salary détérioration has 
been in évidence for the past several décades. During the «golden 
era» of the i960's, for example, the average annual salary increase for 
university teachers was well below that of médical doctors, lawyers 
and dentists. Thus, the average salary of professors, which was inferior 
to that of other professionals at the beginning of the i960's, had 
deteriorated even more in relative terms by 1970.7 The real crunch, 
however, came during the 1970's when not only was salary a problem 
but, in addition, there came serious threats to employment security.8 
Nor does Professor Woods note the inadéquate nature of appeals 
procédures on most Canadian campuses. Thèse procédures are usually 
poorly specified. It is not uncommon for the principal administrator 
or governing board to hâve the prérogative of making the final judge-
ment. Processes which lead to neutral, unbiased décisions are rare.9 
Several faculty associations in Canada hâve attempted to address 
thèse issues via co-operative approaches. Typically, they hâve formed 
committees which document the case of the faculty, and informai dis-
cussions with the administration ensue. In some cases this approach 
has been satisfactory to date, but in many cases it has not been. 
Concerning compensation and employment security, for example, 
where administration and faculty disagree, it is the administration 
which makes the final, unilatéral décision and there is little or nothing 
the association may do in response. Nor is the administration under 
any formai compulsion to discuss such issues if it chooses not to do so. 
In such a situation the faculty is at the mercy of the administration 
to conduct itself in a benevolent, concensus-seeking manner. Given the 
uncertainties of the times, reliance on administration good will is, we 
believe, poor insurance against unacceptable developments. Where 
faculty associations and other professional groups hâve unionized, it is 
usually because more co-operative approaches were first tried and found 
to be inadéquate. 
6
 See THOMPSON, op. cit. The Canadian expérience has not been entirely 
négative, Ian MCKENNA of the CAUT has pointed out to me in correspondence, that 
«a spirit of co-operation has existed throughout the collective bargaining process» at 
both the University of Ottawa and the University Collège of Cape Breton. 
7
 David DODGE, «Artificial Restrictions in Labour Markets», Canadian 
Perspective in Economies, Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., 1972, and OCUFA Newsletter, 
September, 1973. 
8
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Censure», CAUT Bulletin, May, 1975. 
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Under collective bargaining the administration is legally obliged 
to negotiate with the faculty over ail issues of concern. If no satisfactory 
resolution is reached then conciliation may be turned to in the first 
instance. If the administration is willing, arbitration may be used as a 
final step. If the administration is unwilling then the faculty may legally 
withhold its services pending a satisfactory solution. 
By law grievance procédures ending in binding arbitration must 
be established for the resolution of ail disputes arising out of the 
collective agreement. Présent appeals procédures might continue but, 
under collective bargaining, faculty members would hâve the oppor-
tunity of their cases being reviewed and judged by an unbiased third 
party should traditional procédures prove unsatisfactory. 
Although many administrators react as though faculty unionism 
were a personal insuit to them, in fact collective bargaining has the 
potential to be a benefit to the entire university community. Under 
law, the collective agreement is inviolate. Administrators and faculty 
associations may utilize this fact to negotiate clauses which insulate 
the institution from the pressure of governments for « more scholar for 
the dollar». Moreover, with a strong, organized faculty association in 
résidence, the bargaining power of the président should increase vis-a-
vis the government in budget negotiations. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerning such issues as curriculum, teaching, research, and 
teacher sélection, collégial procédures make practical sensé; and, where 
décisions are made responsibly, they are to the benefit of both the 
faculty and the administration who usually agrée on the primacy of 
académie excellence. Bureaucratie decision-making concerning such 
issues would almost certainly produce a poorer quality university to 
the détriment of ail concerned. Where administrators are tempted to 
bureaucratize thèse aspects of university life, collective bargaining may 
provide a bulwark against such incursions. 
Where faculty members are not unionized, they hâve little power 
to effectively influence décisions concernig compensation, employment 
security and internai justice. Through long expérience, collective 
bargaining has accumulated a record as being the instrument that is most 
capable of effectively resolving disputes over thèse issues. Faculty 
unionism does not, as Professor Woods suggests, split the university 
horizontally. Concerning compensation, etc., the split exists prior to 
unionization. Collective bargaining is a way of ensuring that both sides 
hâve a say in the détermination of thèse conditions of employment, 
thus producing more commitment by each side to the outcome of 
negotiations. 
In conclusion, we suggest that collective bargaining and colle-
giality are not contradictory. Rather, certification as a trade union is 
simply a means which faculty members may utilize to counter the 
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power of the administration, thereby consolidating and expanding their 
influence on university government . Collective bargaining may also be 
an effective method for administrations and faculties to jointly use in 
moderating the influence of government on the universit ies. 
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